Obscenity - Liquor Regulations; California v. LaRue by Bernstein, Richard
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
August 2015
Obscenity - Liquor Regulations; California v.
LaRue
Richard Bernstein
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Sexuality and
the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernstein, Richard (1973) "Obscenity - Liquor Regulations; California v. LaRue," Akron Law Review: Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 13.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/13
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBSCENITY-
LIQUOR REGULATIONS
California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972).
T HE DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, an administra-
tive agency vested by the California Constitution with primary
authority for the licensing of the sale of alcoholic beverages in that
State, promulgated rules in 1970 regulating the type of entertainment
which might be presented in bars and night clubs which it licensed.' The
Commission is vested with the authority to suspend or revoke any such
license if it determines that its continuation would be contrary to
public welfare or morals.
2
Concerned with a progression from "topless" to "bottomless" dancers
and other forms of "live entertainment" which it licensed, the Commission
held public hearings3 and promulgated the following rules.
In summary, they provide:
(1) 143.2 prohibits topless waitresses
(2) 143.3
(a) prohibits nude entertainers;
(b) regulates the content of entertainment;
(c) requires that certain entertainers
perform on a stage
(3) 143.4 regulates the content of movies
(4) 143.5 prohibits any entertainment which violates
a city or county ordinance.4
Various holders of California liquor licenses and dancers at licensed
premises brought actions in the U.S. District Court 5 challenging the
constitutionality of all four rules, regulating the content of live entertain-
1 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972).
2 Cal. Const. Art. 20 § 22. That section provides in part:
The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control shall have the exclusive power,
except as herein provided and in accordance with laws enacted by the Legisla-
ture, to license the manufacture, importation and sale of alcoholic beverages in
this State, and to collect license fees or occupation taxes on account thereof.
The Department shall have the power, in its discretion, to deny, suspend or
revoke any specific alcoholic beverages license if it shall determine for good
cause that the granting or continuance of such license would be contrary to
public welfare or morals, or that a person seeking or holding a license has
violated any law prohibiting conduct involving moral turpitude.
3 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972).
4 LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 350 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd 93 S. CL 390 (1972).
For full text see LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 358-60 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
5 LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972).
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ment in violation of First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
However, at oral argument, the plaintiffs withdrew their objections in
these actions to the Rules which (1) prohibit topless waitresses, (2) permit
local regulations, and (3) require certain entertainers to be on a stage.6
The plaintiffs thus conceded that topless waitresses were not within
the protection of the First Amendment; that local ordinances had to be
independently challenged depending upon their content, and that the
requirement that certain entertainers must dance on a stage was not valid.7
The District Court held that the "Rules of the Department as
written; which prohibit the content of movies and live entertainment, are
invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments," 8 concluding that
under standards laid down by the Supreme Court, some of the proscribed
entertainment could not be classified as obscene 9 or lacking a
communicative element. 10
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that it did not view the
challenged regulations in the context of censoring a dramatic performance.
They viewed the regulations as to what the state may do in regard to
the licensing of bars and nightclubs to sell liquor by the drink."
The majority states as a basis for its holding that the "broad sweep of
the 21st Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more
than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals." 12
In Hostetler v. Idlewild Liquor Corp.,1 the Court held that by reason of
the Twenty-first Amendment "a State is totally unconfined by traditional
Commerce Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxi-
cants destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders."1 4
The Supreme Court has upheld a Michigan statute prohibiting
Michigan dealers from selling beer manufactured in a state which
6 LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 350 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972).
7 Id. at 350, 351.
8 Id. at 348, 358.
9 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1OSee U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
11 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 395 (1972).
12 Id.
13 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
14 Hostetler v. Idlewild Liquor, 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964). In Hostetler, an action was
brought by a New York corporation to enjoin New York State Liquor Authority
members from interfering with the corporation's business of selling tax-free bottled
wines and liquors to departing international airline travelers at the airport for delivery
to travelers upon their arrival at their foreign destinations. The court allowed the
injunction since the Twenty-first Amendment only authorized state control of the
importation of intoxicants and not the exportation of liquors.
[Vol. 6:2
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discriminated against Michigan beer.u The view of the scope of the
Twenty-first Amendment with respect to a State's power to restrict,
regulate, or prevent the traffic and distribution of intoxicants within
its borders has remained unquestioned. 16
In Seagram & Sons v. Hostetler,17 the Court felt that a New York
Alcoholic Beverage Control Law 18 provision tying the New York price of
brand liquor to the national price did not violate due process' 9 by impos-
ing an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious burden on brand owners.
The Court felt that the California Commission's regulations were
reasonable and within the scope of the powers delegated to the
Commission, in light of the administrative hearings. 20 In Assigned Car
Cases,21 the opinion spoke of the powers of the Interstate Commerce
Commission:
In the case at bar, the functions exercised by the Commission are
wholly legislative. Its authority to legislate is limited to establishing
a reasonable rule. But in establishing a rule of general application, it
is not a condition of its validity that there be adduced evidence of
its appropriateness in respect to every railroad to which it will be
applicable. In this connection, the Commission, like other legislators
may reason from the particular to the general. 22
The majority gave full support to the Commission's utilization of
the regulations as a "prophylactic solution" to rid licensed premises of the
proscribed motion pictures and conduct.
The day is gone when this court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws; regulatory of
'5 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939). "Since the
Twenty-first Amendment ... the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation
of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause ..... Id. at 394. See also,
Finch and Co. v. McKittrich, 305 U.S. 395 (1939).
16 See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetler, 384 U.S. 35 (1966); Hostetler v. Idlewild Liquor
Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964); Dept. of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U.S. 341,
344, 346 (1964); California v. Washington, 358 U.S. 64 (1958); Ziffrin, Inc. v.
Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner, 304 U.S. 401 (1938); State
Board of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
17 384 U.S. 35, 48 (1966).
18 Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, N.Y., § 101-b, subd. 3 (McKinney 1972).
19 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 0 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 395 (1972).
21274 U.S. 564 (1927).
22 Id. at 583.
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business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.23
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, did not feel that
the state regulatory authority is limited to either dealing with the problem
it confronted within the limits of Roth v. United States and Alberts
v. California,24 or in accordance with the prescribed limits for dealing
with some forms of communicative conduct in United States v. O'Brien.2 5
The "proper standard" which the court adopts in Roth v. United
States and Alberts v. California is "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. ' 26 In pronouncing
this standard the court stated that "the early leading standard of
obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an
isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons." 27 Some American
courts adopted this standard, but later decisions have rejected it by
substituting the Roth test.28 O'Brien rejected the notion that "an apparent-
ly limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever a person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea"; and held that
Government regulation of speech-related conduct is permissible
[I]f it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 29
23 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). See Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. State of Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, A.F. of L.
v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. State of Nebraska
ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
24 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
25 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
26 This test is drawn from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Tentative
Draft No. 6, § 207.10(2).
27 Regina v. Hichlin, 3 Q.B. 360 (L.R. 1860).
28Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); United States v. Limehouse, 285 U.S.
424 (1932); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896); Swearingen v. United
States, 161 U.S. 446 (1896); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 221 F.2d 42 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) (Applicable Statute: 39 U.S.C.A. § 259a); United States v. Levine, 83
F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. One Book called "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705(2d Cir. 1934); United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48
F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1931); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930);
United States v. Harmon, 45 Fed. 414 (D.C. Cir. 1891); Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F.
Supp. 534 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
29 U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 376, 377 (1968).
[Vol 6:2
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The majority cites Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 0 which held that
motion pictures are "included within the free speech and press guarantees
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments 'though not' necessarily subject
to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression."
3
'
The present opinion noted that in Schacht v. United States,
32 actors
were deemed to enjoy the constitutional right of free speech; including
a right to openly criticize the government.
In light of First and Fourteenth amendment rights allocated to these
areas, the Court reasons that the "states may sometimes proscribe
expression which is directed to the accomplishment of an end which the
state has declared to be illegal when such expression consists, in part, of
'conduct' or 'action.' ,,33 In Hughes v. Superior Court of California3 4 the
decision included the following: "We cannot construe the Due Process
Clause as precluding California from securing respect for its policy against
30 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
31Id. pp. 502-503.
Burstyn involved a New York Statute, N.Y. Education Law, § 101 (McKinney
1947); N.Y. Const., Art. V, § 4, authorizing the appointment by the Board of Regents
of a head of the motion picture division of the education department to examine
motion picture films and to issue licenses tlierefor unless the film is "Sacrilegious,"
etc. The Court held this to be an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech and of
free press. U.S. Const. amend. I, XIV. See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Pincus v.
Pilchess, 429 F.2d 416 (CA 9 1970) aff'd by equally divided court sub nom.
California v. Pinkus, 400 U.S. 922 (1970).
32 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970).
In Schacht, the petitioner had been indicted in a United States District Court
for violating United States Code (U.S.C.) § 702, which made it a crime for any
person, "without authority [to wear] the uniform or a distinctive part thereof... of
any of the armed forces of the United States...."
The Supreme Court reversed a conviction stating "the general prohibition of"
18 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 702 cannot always stand alone in view of 10
United States Code (U.S.C.) § 772(f), which authorizes the wearing of military
uniforms under certain conditions and circumstances including the circumstance of an
actor portraying a member of the armed services in a "theatrical production," 10
United States Code (U.S.C.) § 772(f). See, e.g., P.B.I.C. Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp.
757 (Mass. 1970), vacated to consider mootness, 401 U.S. 987 (1971); In re Giannini,
69 Ca.2d 563, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535 (1968), cert. denied sub nom.
California v. Giannini, 395 U.S. 910 (1969).
33 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 396 (1972).
34 339 U.S. 460,466 (1950).
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involuntary employment on racial lines by prohibiting systematic picketing
that would subvert such policy."35
The majority concludes that while at least some of the performances
to which these regulations address themselves are within the limits of the
constitutional protection of freedom of expression, the critical fact is that
California has not forbidden these performances across the board. It
has merely proscribed such performances in establishments which
it licenses to sell liquor by the drink.
Mr. Justice Marshall, in a vigorous dissent, states that the
regulations are unconstitutional on their face as violative of the First
Amendment. He contends that this is true even if the conduct of the party
challenging such statutes could be prohibited under a more narrowly
drawn scheme.36
The state has the power to regulate the distribution of liquor and
enforce health and safety regulations, but the state may not broadly stifle
First Amendment freedoms when doing so.37 "The breath of legislative
abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose." s38 The Court has consistently held
that only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within
the state's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First
Amendment freedoms.39
35 Id. Thus, California was not barred by the Fourteenth Amendment from use of an
injunction to prohibit the picketing of a store solely in order to secure compliance
with a demand that the store's employees be in proportion to the racial origin of its
then customers.
See, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). See, e.g.,
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
36California v. LaRue 93 S. Ct. 390, 400 (1972). Mr. Justice Marshall citingThornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 (1964); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-433 (1963). See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161(1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515, 516 (1939).
37 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 401 (1972). Mr. Justice Marshall citing Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
38Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 487 (1960). See P. A. Freund, The Supreme Court
and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 539-40 (1951); Note, Inseparability in
Application of Statutes Impairing Civil Liberties, 61 HAR. L. REv. 1208, 1210 (1948).
Cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368, 370 (1931); Yuh Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
See, e.g., Jones v. Opeliha, 316 U.S. 584, 611 (1942); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
Where different constitutional issues have been involved, more administrative
leeway has been thought allowable to accomplish a clearly constitutional purpose.See Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,
270 U.S. 230 (1926) dissenting opinion; Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226
U.S. 192 (1912). But ci. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
9N.A.A.C.p. v. Button, 371 U.S. 438 (1963).
[Vol. 6:2
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The dissent argues that if we recognize movies and plays as enjoying
First Amendment protection, we must observe the stringent standards
set up by the court to prohibit the speech.40 The regulations are viewed
as a condition to the licensing of California bars. The State "may not deny
a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests-especially, his freedom of speech."'41
Although a State may, in proper circumstances, enact a broad
regulatory scheme which, incidentally, restricts First Amendment Rights,
classifications which discriminate against the exercise of constitutional
rights per se must be shown necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest. 42
It seems that one cannot help but to view the majority with a critical
eye. The California rules would legitimately seem to be able to rest under
the constitutional veil either by satisfying the O'Brien requirements, the
Roth test, or the compelling interest that is requisite to the state's
incidental restriction of First Amendment rights.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist states in his opinion that the "states may
sometimes proscribe expression which is directed to the accomplishment
of an end which the state has declared to be illegal when such expression
consists, in part, of 'conduct' or 'action.' "43 Such a statement would seem
to require the government to meet the requirements laid out by the
Supreme Court in view of California's regulation of this entertainment."
Instead of any of these pronounced standards, the California
regulations are sustained on the grounds that the state may regulate the
forms of entertainment in bars via the Twenty-first Amendment. A rather
40 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 403 (1972). Mr. Justice Marshall citing Schenk
v. United States 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918). Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also, Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffen, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Herdon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
41 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 406 (1972). See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 397 (1963).
See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Pickering v. Board
of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S.
252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). But cf.
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council
v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
42Califomia v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 407 (1972). See, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Shinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
43 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 396 (1972).
44 U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 376-77 (1968).
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rash and improbable extension of such reasoning can lead one to believe
that the state may forbid blacks from entering a licensed bar in a
predominantly white neighborhood because of the existence of racial
tensions. "Freedom of press; freedom of speech, freedom of religion are
in a preferred position."45
The California Commission concerned itself with events that occurred
near bars that presented the proscribed entertainment. At the administra-
tive hearings, it was revealed that rape, prostitution, and indecent
exposure manifested themselves in and around bars.
Mr. Justice Marshall relates that the cause-effect relationship arrived
at by the Commission when tested by empirical data is open to question. 46
The court seems to be on insecure ground in basing its decision on
such a tenuous basis as the Twenty-first Amendment and the raw
conclusions of an administrative body.
RicHARD BERNSTEIN
45 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
46 California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 404 (1972). See, e.g., Report of the Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography 27 (1972); Carrns, Paul and Wishner, Sex Censorship:
The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MnNN. L.
REv. 10009 (1962).
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